Productivity growth, Smith effects and Ricardo effects in Euro Area's manufacturing industries by Carnevali, E et al.
This is a repository copy of Productivity growth, Smith effects and Ricardo effects in Euro 
Area's manufacturing industries.




Carnevali, E, Godin, A, Lucarelli, S et al. (1 more author) (2020) Productivity growth, Smith
effects and Ricardo effects in Euro Area's manufacturing industries. Metroeconomica, 71 
(1). pp. 129-155. ISSN 0026-1386 
https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12270
© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Carnevali, E, Godin, A, Lucarelli, S, Veronese Passarella, M. Productivity growth, Smith 
effects and Ricardo effects in Euro Area's manufacturing industries. Metroeconomica. 
2019; 00: 1– 27, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12270. This article may be used for non-commercial 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
We thank the anonymous referees and the editor for their useful comments and suggestions. 
 
* University of Leeds, UK, and Department for Work and Pensions, UK Government, UK. Responsibility for the information and 
views expressed in the paper lies entirely with the author. † Centre d’Economie de Paris Nord, France and Forum for Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies, Germany. ‡ University of Bergamo, Italy. 
§ University of Leeds, UK. Corresponding author: m.passarella**leeds.ac.uk 
Productivity Growth, Smith Effects and Ricardo Effects 
in Euro Area’s Manufacturing Industries 
 
 
Emilio Carnevali*, Antoine Godin†, Stefano Lucarelli‡ and Marco Veronese Passarella§ 
 
 
Updated: 7th July 2019 (Version No. 7) 
 
Abstract. We analyse the determinants of labour productivity across (a sample of) EA 
member-states. We focus on the divergent dynamics before and after the financial 
crisis, and of core countries relative to peripheral countries. We ground our empirical 
analysis in Paolo Sylos-Labini’s productivity equations. We test different models, 
including a Panel 2S-LS model and a Panel VAR model. Our preliminary findings 
confirm and strengthen Sylos-Labini’s main insights. Labour productivity in 
manufacturing industries is strongly and positively correlated with the market size 
(Smith effect), the relative cost of labour (Ricardo effect), the absolute cost of labour 
(organisation effect), and past investment, whereas it is negatively correlated with 
current investment. Furthermore, we find evidence that the crisis has affected the size 
of these effects. Focusing on the core-periphery dichotomy, the signs of the effects are 
the same for both groups of countries, although the Smith, Ricardo and long-run 
investment effects are usually stronger for core countries compared to peripheral 
countries. The opposite holds for the organisation effect, while investment effects are 
less clear.  
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The gap in productivity growth rates between core and periphery countries is frequently mentioned, 
along with the difference in growth rates of employee compensations, as the main driver of the 
imbalances in the balance of payments among member-states of the European Area (EA) (e.g. Draghi 
2013). That very gap provides the rationale for structural reforms, which are called for to enhance 
competitiveness of peripheral countries, particularly through the increase of labour market flexibility. 
While we recognise that labour productivity is determined endogenously, we question the idea that 
labour market reforms would be the main means to increase productivity. We believe a thorough 
examination of a variety of other possible factors is needed. Our work provides an analysis of the 
determinants of labour productivity in selected EA member-states in the period 1996-2016. We focus on the divergent developments in manufacturing industries of “core” countries relative to “peripheral” 
countries.1 Our empirical examination is grounded in Paolo Sylos-Labini’s “productivity equations” 
(Sylos-Labini 1983, 1995). We test a number of simple theoretical models accounting for the 
endogenous nature of labour productivity. As mentioned, we look at possible differences and 
divergences across EA countries, particularly across early member-states.  
Labour productivity developments in manufacturing industries of some selected EA member-
states are portrayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As stressed by the President of the ECB Mario Draghi 
(2013), a slower growth rate in labour productivity of peripheral countries compared to core countries 
is apparent since the early 2000s, particularly when Ireland is not taken into account. National trends 
within the group of deficit countries are quite heterogeneous though. From mid-1990s to mid-2000s, 
Italy and Spain were both marked by a flat trend in labour productivity. Greece and Portugal, in contrast, 
were characterised by a rapid catching up. After the US financial crisis, labour productivity has 
increased remarkably in Spain and Portugal, whereas it has remained flat in Italy. Greece has been 
marked by a collapse in labour productivity over the same period instead. The development of labour 
productivity rates looks more homogenous across core countries. All of them are marked by an 
increasing trend before the US financial crisis, followed by a general decrease in 2007-2009, and then a 
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As mentioned, the examination of the factors underpinning recent (different) developments in labour 
productivities across EA-members’ manufacturing industries is the main target and the original 
contribution of this research. For this purpose, the rest of the manuscript is organised as follows. In 
section 2, the theoretical framework is discussed. Drawing from Sylos-Labini (1983, 1995), we link 
labour productivity with technological innovation. The latter, in turn, is connected dynamically with the 
size of the goods market (i.e. demand conditions), the absolute cost of labour, the relative cost of labour 
(i.e. the trend in compensation of employees relative to the cost of machinery), and the investment level. 
In section 3, both the data used and the main methodological features of the benchmark model are 
discussed. In section 4, we present the main findings of our empirical analysis. In section 5, we extend 
the model developed in previous sessions to investigate the gap between core countries and peripheral 
countries. Section 6 is devoted to the development of a panel VAR model, aiming at addressing bi-
causality issues with the benchmark model. Section VII provides some final remarks.    
2. The theoretical framework: Sylos-Labini’s productivity equations 
The theoretical starting point of our empirical investigation is the simple model developed by Sylos-
Labini (1983, 1995). While the Sylos-Labini model has been applied to Italian regions and sectors (e.g. Guarini 2007, Guarini 2009, Corsi and D’Ippoliti 2013), it is hardly ever tested on other European 
countries at the sectorial level. There are a few exceptions: Sylos-Labini (1993) presented econometric 
estimates of the productivity equation concerning the manufacturing sector for different countries, 
while Lucarelli and Romano (2016) used a similar model to focus on Germany and Italy.  The model proposed by Sylos-Labini is based on the idea that labour productivity growth in manufacturing industries arises from innovation. The latter, in turn, is driven by four factors. The first factor, which Sylos-Labini called the “Smith effect”, is the size of the domestic market, as pioneeringly emphasised by Adam Smith. This principle echoes the so-called “Kaldor-Verdoorn law”. It postulates 
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 that the rate of technical progress is endogenous. More precisely, it states that labour productivity growth rate is a positive function of the growth rate of the economy or of the industries considered (e.g. Kaldor 1961, 1978, Verdoorn 1949, 1980). This is a key relationship of the Keynesian economics school (Lavoie 2014) and has been validated by many empirical works (e.g. McCombie and Thirlwall 1994, McCombie 2002). The second factor leading firms to innovate is the growth in the absolute cost of labour in real terms. While many different formulations are possible, the absolute cost of labour is simply defined here as the ratio between the wage rate and the price level.2 An increase in the absolute cost of labour leads the firms to improve the allocation of labour inputs to increase efficiency. The new, more efficient, organisation, triggered by the rise in real wages, is expected to bring about an increase in labour productivity.3 The third factor is the growth in the cost of labour relative to the price of investment goods, say, machines. An increase in the relative cost of labour leads the firms to replace workers with machines. Such a result is defined by Sylos-Labini as the “Ricardo effect”.4 The fourth factor affecting labour productivity is the real investment level.5 The impact of investment on 
productivity is twofold: on one hand, a “disturbance effect” is possible in the short run, as the new 
machinery takes time to be used effectively; on the other hand, investment is expected to improve 
labour productivity in the medium to long run.6             
 Using a “dot” to denote growth rates, the average real labour productivity function can be 
defined by means of the expression below, which is linear in the parameters: 
 
  𝑃?̇? = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (?̇?€ − ?̇?) + 𝛽2 ∙ (?̇?€ − ?̇?) + 𝛽3 ∙ (?̇?€ − ?̇?𝑘) + 
  +𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑌 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉−𝜆𝑌−𝜆          (1) 
 
where 𝑉€ is the nominal value added of the economy considered (including both domestic demand 
components and export), 𝑃 is the general price level, 𝑊€ is the nominal wage rate, 𝑃𝑘 is the price of 
machines, 𝐼𝑁𝑉 stands for new (or current) real investment level, 𝑌 is current gross domestic product, 
and the subscript “−𝜆” denotes past (or lagged) variables. 
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 We can simplify equation (1) by using 𝑉 = 𝑉€/𝑃, 𝑈 = 𝑊€/𝑃,  𝑊 = 𝑊€/𝑃𝑘, and 𝐼 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉/𝑌. We 
obtain: 
 
  𝑃?̇? = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ ?̇? + 𝛽2 ∙ ?̇?  + 𝛽3 ∙ ?̇? + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐼−𝜆     (2) 
 
where 𝛽1 captures the Smith effect, 𝛽2 measures the organisation effect, 𝛽3 captures the Ricardo effect, 𝛽4 measures the short-run disturbance effect of newly-undertaken real investment, and 𝛽5 is meant to 
capture the long-run effect of real investment on labour productivity. Notice that coefficients above are 
all expected to be positive, except for 𝛽4. On a close inspection, Sylos-Labini’s theoretical model may 
well be regarded as an implementation and extension of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, where the effect of 
the size of the market on technical progress is one out of four determinants of labour productivity (e.g. 
Sylos Labini 1984).  
3. Data and methodological issues with the benchmark model 
Our dataset covers a subset of current EA member-states from 1996 to 2016 on a quarterly basis at the 
country level. Due to the lack of available data, we focus on eight countries, notably Austria, France, 
Greece, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Definitions and data sources are all provided 
by Table A1 in the Appendix. Estimates have been made using different techniques and different 
clusters of countries (namely “core” vs “peripheral” countries). Heteroskedasticy-robust standard 
errors and covariances have been used, unless otherwise stated. Serial correlation was checked and 
rejected.7 The hypothesis that there were no time trend in productivity growth rates was checked (by a 
Wald test) and not rejected. In order to rule out spurious regressions, we checked the stationarity of 
variables by using a Levin-Lin-Chu test for unit roots in panel datasets.8 Variables of the model are all 
stationary except for investment (taken as a ratio to GDP), which is not expressed as a growth rate (see 
Table A2).  
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 Before we present our main findings, three possible issues are worth discussing. The first issue 
concerns the definition of labour productivity. While, in principle, an engineering measure of 
productivity would be the first best option, such measure is usually unavailable. This is the reason we 
opted for an economic definition of productivity (𝑃𝑅), in line with the available literature. We defined 𝑃𝑅 as real GDP per person employed (at constant prices of 2010). Since the real value added of the 
economy (𝑉) is included among the predictors of the model, endogeneity issues may well be raised. 
More precisely, the value of the coefficient 𝛽1 could be biased, because of the possible loop of causality 
between 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑉. This is a well-known issue that the researchers face when estimating the Smith-
Kaldor-Verdoorn effect. As a result, many attempts at fixing it have been made in the last three decades 
(e.g. McCombie et al. 2002), using cointegration methods (e.g. Gambacorta 2004), feasible generalized 
spatial two-stage least squares estimators (e.g. Angeriz et al. 2008), two-stage ordinary least square 
estimators (e.g. Corsi and D’Ippoliti 2016), pooled cross-section OLS and limited information maximum 
likelihood estimators (e.g. Millemaci and Ofria 2016). Overall, the existence of a strong effect of real 
value added on labour productivity has been observed whatever the correction method chosen. We 
addressed the possible endogeneity by using the (average quarterly change in) crude oil price as an 
instrumental variable. Asymmetric though it is, the effect of oil price shocks on economic growth is 
widely recognised in the literature (e.g. Jiménez-Rodríguez 2008; Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez 2005, 
2009) and it is commonly used in the works on the Smith-Kaldor-Verdoorn law (e.g. Millemaci and Ofria 
2014). While oil price affects the value added, labour productivity is unlikely to affect the oil price 
directly.9 Accordingly, we ran a two-stage least square regression by instrumenting for the oil price. We 
found that the effect of a change in the real value added of the economy on labour productivity growth 
is in line with the literature on the Kaldor-Verodoorn effect. 
A second possible issue is that the relationship between labour productivity and output growth 
in manufacturing industries is expected to be cyclical and driven by output fluctuations when labour 
protection is high. This was the case of major European countries up until the early 1990s. However, 
labour market reforms (which have been introduced ever since) have made employment more sensitive 
to output fluctuations, while weakening the possible impact on labour productivity. As mentioned, we 
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depart from the Sylos-Labini model in Section 6, where we consider all the interdependencies among 
our variables using a VAR model. 
A third issue concerns the specification of the model proposed by Sylos-Labini. The point is that 
we cannot exclude that other variables could affect innovation and labour productivity – think of the 
price of raw materials, State-led innovation policies, differences in employment rates, and labour 
market conditions. While we take explicitly into consideration labour protection (as this is one of the 
most mentioned factors in the literature), we assume that State-led policies are mirrored by 
government spending, and therefore are completely captured by the Smith effect. We are aware that 
this is a controversial assumption, which should be investigated in future researches. In addition, we 
neglect the possible impact of raw material prices (other than oil price) on innovation and productivity. 
We also assume away the negative relationship between employment rates and productivity rates 
across nations.10 However, this choice should not affect our findings, as there is evidence that the trade-
off between productivity growth and job creation has been weakening since the 1980s in most OECD 
countries (Cavelaars 2005). Overall, the rationale of the simplifying assumptions above is to stick as 
much as possible to the original Sylos-Labini model, thus anchoring it to a sound theoretical structure. 
Our key findings are discussed in the next section. 
4. Productivity determinants in EA8 countries: a simple Panel OLS model 
Overall, our empirical analysis supports Sylos-Labini (1983, 1995)’s theoretical insights. Key variables 
have all a strong impact on labour productivity growth rates across EA countries. The extended 
functional form we estimated is: 
 𝑑(log(𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡)) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑑(log(𝑉𝑖𝑡)) + 𝛽2 ∙  𝑑(log(𝑈𝑖𝑡)) + 𝛽3 ∙  𝑑(log(𝑊𝑖𝑡)) +                                                         +𝛽4 ∙  𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5 ∙  𝐼𝑖𝑡−𝜆 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 
where subscript “𝑖” stands for country, “𝑡” stands for time, log (∙) is natural logarithm, 𝜆 is the investment 
time lag, 𝛼𝑖 are country fixed effects (if any, where: 𝛼𝑖 = ?̅? if no specific effects are found), and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are 
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error terms. We used dummies, 𝐷𝑡 , to account for the effect of the US financial crisis on the world 
economy, and the labour protection index, 𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 , to take into consideration the possible impact of labour 
market conditions on productivity. 
 As mentioned, estimates have been made by using different models and different clusters of 
countries. Initially, we focused on the whole sample (EA8 hereafter), including both peripheral 
countries (notably, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and core countries (notably, Austria, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands). In accordance with Sylos-Labini’s theory, estimates are made for the 
manufacturing industry. Results are reported in Table 1. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT HERE TABLE 1] 
 The proportion of response variation of productivity growth explained by the models’ regressors is 
rather high, as coefficients of determination (i.e. Adjusted 𝑅2) are all above 68%. Model 1 is the simplest 
model we tested. Coefficients are all statistically significant at the 1% threshold and below. The market 
size (Smith effect), the relative cost of labour (Ricardo effect), and the organisation effect, have all a 
positive impact on the real productivity of labour, thereby supporting Sylos-Labini insights. However, 
model 1 could be affected by misspecification. Some possible productivity drivers identified by Sylos-
Labini are not taken into account, the most important one being the investment level. The impact of 
current and past investment (meaning one-lag investment) is considered by model 2.11 Coefficients are 
all statistically significant. Signs are all consistent with Sylos Labini’s theory (meaning a positive sign 
for the Smith Effect, the organisation effect, the Ricardo Effect, and the long-run effect of real 
investment, and a negative sign for the short-run disturbance effect of newly-undertaken real 
investment).12 
 Models 1 and 2 are pooled OLS estimations based on the assumption that there is a common 
constant term for all countries included in our sample. In principle, it would be possible to introduce 
some degree of heterogeneity by using a cross-country fixed effects estimator. This is made by model 
2bis in the Table 1. The validity of the fixed effects method is assessed through an F-test, comparing the 
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fit of model 2 with that of model 2bis. Since it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
country-specific dummy variables are not jointly statistically different from zero, we stick to the pooled 
OLS estimator model with a common constant term (model 2).13 
 Another factor that could have affected productivity levels across European countries is the so-called “European sovereign debt crisis” following the US financial crisis. Model 3 is augmented with a 
dummy variable to take into account the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, which has been 
taking place since the third quarter of 2008. Clearly, both the choice of the date and the way the crisis 
should be accounted for are anything but trivial. In principle, the crisis can be modelled in many ways. 
The first one consists in spotting a conventional date for the beginning of the crisis (for instance, the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to be used as a point of discontinuity in the productivity rates of 
selected countries. This echoes the stance that the Global Financial Crisis was the beginning of a new 
economic era, characterised by a “secular stagnation” (e.g. Summers 2014). We tested this hypothesis 
by using a dummy variable that splits the period into two sub-periods: up to 2008Q3, and 2008Q4 
onwards. As the dummy variable was not statistically significant at 10% level and below (see model 3), 
we tried also an alternate solution. We focused on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, lasting roughly from the beginning of Greece’s debt crisis (December 2009) to Draghi’s “whatever it takes” public 
statement (July 2012), meaning the period 2010Q1 to 2012Q3. Once again, the dummy was not 
statistically significant at 10% level and below (see Table A5). A third solution is to take into account 
each single quarter in which the Euro Area has recorded a negative growth rate of the GDP. These 
quarters are grouped in two different periods: 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 and 2011Q1 to 2013Q1, respectively. 
Result are showed by Table A6. This time the dummy variable is statistically significant at 1% and 
below. The lagged investment is no longer statistically significant. However, it becomes significant (and 
positive) at the 1% level if a number of lags > 2 is used. In addition, the adjusted 𝑅2 of the model 
improves (see Table A7).  
Using a dummy variable to account for the crisis allows checking whether the position of the 𝑛-
dimension surface of the OLS estimator had shifted during the crisis relative to other periods. While our 
findings led us to reject any country-specific fixed effect, we found some evidence of the impact of the 
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European Sovereign Debt Crisis on productivity rates across selected countries. The impact of the crisis 
was also tested by allowing every coefficient to change following the shock. In other words, we tested the presence of a “structural break” in the model. For this purpose, we split our sample into two main 
periods. The third quarter of 2008, marking the collapse of Lehman Brothers, was chosen as the critical 
threshold. Two different models, a pre-Lehman model and a post-Lehman one, were set up and 
compared.14 Results are shown in Table A3. Notice that we used just one lag for past investment, as this 
option is the one that offers the best performance in absence of a crisis dummy variable. As expected, 
coefficient values for the two models are remarkably different. While some regressors are no longer 
significant (i.e. lagged investment in pre-Lehman model and the real wage for the post-Lehman one), 
signs are all consistent with Sylos-Labini’s theory.  More specifically, the crisis has reduced the Smith 
effect and the organisation effect relative to the pre-crisis period, whereas it has boosted the Ricardo 
effect and the disturbance effect of investment in the short run. We used a Chow test to check whether 
the difference between the two models is statistically significant. The test confirmed that a structural 
break occurred at 1% confidence level and below.15  
A possible explanation for the organisation effect is that firms are encouraged to use labour in 
a more efficient way as it becomes more expensive, i.e. as the real wage increases. This can result in an 
increase in labour productivity. Another explanation is the so-called “incentive effect” or “efficiency wage theory”. It could be named also the “Marshall effect”, because Alfred Marshall was the first author to link workers’ efficiency rates with their wage rates (Marshall 1890). In short, higher wages attract 
highly productive workers and encourage them to be more efficient (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). The 
impact of wages on productivity depends also on the market structure of the economy. For instance, 
firms may well charge the higher costs of production to the consumers. The higher the monopoly power 
of firms, the higher the unit price, and hence the lower the real wage that firms are implicitly willing to 
pay. The point is that the organisation effect depends on “market forms, on intensity of foreign 
competition, and on the economic policy – including the foreign exchange rates policy – adopted by the government” (Sylos-Labini 1984, p. 170). The recession suffered by most European countries after 2008 
has affected deeply their market structures, through bankruptcies, mergers and takeovers. This process 
11 
 of “natural selection” has increased concentration and reduced competition in the manufacturing 
industries, thus bringing about lower “organisation effect” coefficients (because firms have become less 
sensitive to absolute labour costs). In addition, the reduction in the demand for labour is usually smaller 
than the reduction in output, as long as the latter is expected to be a temporary phenomenon.16 Firms 
accept a lower product per worker, due to the lower demand for products, as they do not want to lose their workers’ “knowhow”. In fact, rigid nominal wages coupled with decreasing prices can even result 
in a negative relationship between real wages and productivity during slumps. The third column of 
Table A3 shows that, not only is the organisation effect coefficient lower after the crisis relative to its 
pre-crisis value, but it is no longer statistically significant. 
The different impact of the real wage on productivity over the business cycle can also help 
explain the differences in Smith effect coefficients, which are reported by Table A3. During the boom, 
the increasing extent of the market triggers economies of scale, learning by doing, and innovation, which 
boost labour productivity. During the crisis, the reduction in productivity due to the fall in trade is likely 
to be slower, because firms’ adjustment to the new conditions is usually more prudent and gradual. By 
contrast, Riccardo effect is remarkably higher in the post-crisis scenario (we refer again to Table A3). A 
possible explanation is that exceptionally low interest rates made firms more sensitive to changes in 
the relative cost of labour. For, other things being equal, a lower cost of credit makes it cheaper for firms 
to purchase capital goods relative to labour inputs. Finally, the disturbance effect of investment in the 
short run is (slightly) stronger in the after-crisis period. Interestingly, investment to GDP ratios of most 
EA countries have reduced compared to their pre-crisis values, despite the lower GDP growth rates. 
This can explain why the short-run impact of investment is asymmetrical: when investment is high and 
increasing, the disturbance effect of an additional unit of investment is proportionally lower; when 
investment is low and decreasing, the disturbance effect is higher.         
 We tested also the impact of labour market conditions on productivity (model 4). Although this 
effect was not advocated by Sylos-Labini, the implementation of labour market reforms has been 
frequently said to foster productivity (e.g. Scarpetta and Tressel 2002, 2004; Bassanini et al. 2009; Kang 
2015; European Commission 2015). To test the impact of labour market conditions, we used the labour 
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protection index (LPI) provided by the OECD. Our findings do not support the view that a reduction in 
labour protection would promote labour productivity. The LPI coefficient is not statistically significant 
(model 4). We obtained the same result using the change in LPI (instead of its absolute level) and/or 
using lags (up to 6) to account for the possible mismatch between legislative changes and their effects 
on the labour market.17 The lack of significance of labour market conditions (at the macroeconomic 
level) is coherent with the (microeconomic) finding that “more flexibility in labour relations appears to 
be without problems in Silicon Valley-type garage businesses. […] flexible working has no impact on 
innovation among young and small firms. In industries that tend towards a routinised innovation model, however, such flexibility appears to be harmful” (Kleinknecht et al. 2014, p. 10-11; see also Vergeer and 
Kleinknecht 2014 ). However, the LPI is only available on annual basis. In fact, it is quite stable over 
time, for it usually changes following major reforms of the labour market. As a result, the LPI is only a 
rough indicator of the impact of labour market institutions on productivity. To address this problem, 
we used the early-2000s reforms of the German labour market (the so-called Hartz IV) to check for a 
structural break in our model, using data for Germany. The Chow test revealed that one cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the parameters of the restricted model (estimated for the whole sample) 
equalled the parameters of the unrestricted model (based on the discontinuity after the implementation 
of Hartz IV).18  This provides us with additional evidence about the non-significant impact of labour market reforms on productivity. Interestingly, Germany’s average productivity growth rate was 0.82% 
per quarter before the discontinuity point (i.e. from the third quarter of 1996 to first quarter of 2006), 
whereas it was only 0.35% in the subsequent decade. Our interpretation is that the US financial crisis, 
and then the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, have affected productivity growth rates across Europe. 
The impact of the two crises was arguably less dramatic in Germany relative to other EA member-states. 
However, our tests suggest that economic growth and the other factors identified by Sylos-Labini were 
the main drivers of productivity, not labour market legislation. 
Finally, we addressed the possible endogeneity issue concerning the real value added by using 
the oil price growth rate and the one-period lagged real value added as instrumental variables within a 
two-stage least square estimation (model 5).19 We found that the Smith effect coefficient is statistically 
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significant and lower compared with previous estimations. Its value (0.57) is now very close to the value 
estimated by the most recent literature on the Kaldor-Verdoorn's effect (e.g. McCombie et at. 2002, 
Magacho and McCombie 2017). In fact, comparing models 1-4 with model 5 shows the importance of 
using instruments when estimating the impact of the value added of the economy on labour 
productivity. The point is that simple OLS models overestimate value added coefficients, thus 
overvaluing returns to scale in manufacturing industries. Notice also that the organisation effect and 
the Ricardo effect are both positive and statistically significant, although investment variables are no 
longer statistically significant in the 2S-LS model.20 Table A8 in the Appendix shows our results when a 
2S-LS approach is used for all the models. Overall, key qualitative findings are confirmed, even though 
coefficient sizes are different. The Smith effect is always smaller than in OLS-estimated models. As 
mentioned, its value is now close to the value estimated by the most recent literature on the Kaldor-
Verdoorn’s effect. 
5. Productivity determinants in peripheral countries vs. core countries 
We can now focus on the different productivity trends of periphery and core countries, respectively. 
The first group includes those countries that have been hit most by recent crises, and have been forced 
to adopt structural reforms, particularly in the labour market.21 The second group includes the two 
dominant European nations (Germany and France) and other EA members that are strongly 
interconnected with the Franco-German chain of value. Core countries have been characterised, on 
average, by a quicker recovery compared to periphery countries. The key divide between the two 
groups is the different trend in current (and financial) accounts of the balance of payments. That divide 
is possibly mirrored by the parameters of productivity equations. Estimates about periphery countries 
are displayed by Table 2. 
 




It is worth noticing that the coefficients of determination have remarkably decreased, as they are now 
all between 53% and 54%. Sylos-Labini’s regressors are usually highly significant, the only exceptions 
being current and lagged investments.  
 Turning to core countries, estimates are reported by Table 3. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT HERE TABLE 3] 
 
Coefficients of determination have increased significantly. They are all above 85%. Sylos-Labini’s 
regressors are usually highly significant, including current investment. The only exception is lagged 
investment, which is never significant. Interestingly, both the Smith and the Ricardo effects seem to be 
stronger when focusing on core countries. By contrast, the organisation effect looks stronger for 
peripheral countries. In other words, core countries seem to be more sensitive to changes in the size of 
the market and the relative cost of labour (meaning the wage to machine price ratio). Peripheral 
countries, in turn, seem to be more sensitive to changes in the absolute cost of labour. Finally, current 
investment affects labour productivity of core countries, but it does not seem to affect labour 
productivity in peripheral countries’ manufacturing industries. However, the null hypothesis that 
parameter values are identical across the two groups cannot be rejected.22 
An alternative way to test the difference between core and peripheral countries is to use dummy 
variables. Using model 2 as the benchmark model, we introduced a dummy variable (1 for core 
countries; 0 for periphery countries) to assess the unobserved heterogeneity between periphery and 
core countries (Model A). We also assessed each individual coefficient (Model B), to cope with the “degrees of freedom” issue affecting the Chow test. Our findings are displayed by Table 4.   
 
[PLEASE INERT HERE TABLE 4] 
 
Although not statistically significant, the differences between the two groups of countries can be 
explained by the fact that a higher research intensity (of core countries relative to peripheral countries) 
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leads to higher returns to scale and thus a higher Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient (e.g. Romero and Britto 
2017). Similarly, higher research intensity can make manufacturing firms more prone (and capable) to 
replace workers with machines, when the wage growth rate outstrips the machine price growth rate 
(Ricardo effect). Finally, the lower research intensity can explain also the higher sensitivity of 
peripheral countries to the absolute cost of labour (organisation effect), as wage cuts become the main 
way to enhance competitiveness.    
6.  A Panel VAR model 
As mentioned, Sylos Labini’s theory is based on a single equation that explains labour productivity as 
the result of five determinants. Clearly, the assumed causality is from the five independent variables 
(value added, absolute cost of labour, relative cost of labour, current investment and past investment) 
to labour productivity. However, reverse causality effects cannot be ruled out. For instance, productivity 
should be expected to affect competitiveness and therefore export, aggregate demand, and the value 
added of the economy. In fact, one of the possible issues with the Smith-Kaldor-Verdoorn effect is that 
a cumulative causation between aggregate demand and supply conditions is likely to occur. This means 
that labour productivity causes and is caused by the value added of the economy. In other words, there 
is a problem of endogeneity, possibly affecting OLS estimations. Similarly, labour productivity changes 
may well affect real wage rates bargained by workers with their employers. Real wages and the growth 
rate of GDP, in turn, can influence the investment plans of the firms.  
In sections 4 and 5, we addressed endogeneity by using the oil price and the lagged value added 
of the economy as instrumental variables. However, reverse causality is not necessarily at odds with 
Sylos-Labini’s approach. Sylos-Labini himself pointed out that “productivity increases as cause and 
effect of the increase of real wages: cause, since the increase in productivity induces trade unions to 
demand higher wages and, at the same time, allows the firms to pay them (...); effect, since firms try to 
offset wage increases by saving labour either in absolute terms by rationalizing the productive process, 
or in relative terms by introducing machines capable of increasing productivity” (Sylos Labini 1984, p. 169). He also observed that the “level of investment depends primarily on demand pressure” (Sylos 
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Labini 1984, p. 172), meaning the size of the market (captured by the value added in our model). 
Building upon these preliminary insights, we chose to test other bi-directional causality effects. For 
instance, since the average real wage rate mirrors the bargaining power of the labour force, an increase 
in real wages may well lead the firms to replace workers with machines. In other words, investment 
plans are likely to be affected by the wage level. After all, firms buy machinery (also) to ensure “discipline” and “political stability” in the workplace (e.g. Kalecki 1943). We can name this mechanism the “Marx-Kalecki effect”. 
The point is that causalities are multiple. In addition, both dominant and reverse effects can take 
time to show up, as causalities come into play with a certain number of lags. To address this cumulative 
causation issue, some authors have suggested to use vector autoregression (VAR) models, in which all 
variables are treated as endogenous and interdependent (e.g. Coad et al. 2011, Forges-Davanzati et al. 
2016). We opted for a VAR model with 8 lags (two years) and a sample size of 560 observations.23 This 
allowed us to account for lagged effects, while retaining a sufficient number of observations. In formal 
terms, the new model can be written as:  
 𝐱𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐀0𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝐀𝑖(ℓ) 𝐗𝑡−1 + 𝐮𝑖,𝑡     𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
 
where 𝐱𝑖,𝑡  is the 𝑀 × 1 vector of endogenous variables for country 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝐀0𝑖 (𝑡) is a vector that 
captures all the deterministic components of the data for country 𝑖, 𝐀𝑖(ℓ) is a polynomial in the lag 
operator that defines the coefficients for country 𝑖, 𝐗𝑡  is the stacked version of 𝐱𝑖,𝑡, meaning that 𝐗𝑡 =(𝐱1,𝑡′ , 𝐱2,𝑡′ , … , 𝐱𝑁,𝑡′ )′, and 𝐮𝑖𝑡 is the vector of random disturbances. Notice that 𝑀 = 5, 𝑁 = 9, and 𝑇 = 79 
in our model. Results of the Granger causality test are reported in Table A4. Overall, lagged variables 
are all statistically significant for every equation.24 This is coherent with the hypothesis of multiple 
causality. Impulse response functions and variance decomposition are displayed by Figure 3 and Figure 
4, respectively. Focusing on each individual variable, labour productivity is affected by lagged value 
added, while value added is affected by lagged productivity. Both effects are positive and, therefore, 
consistent with Sylos-Labini’s theory. However, notice that the resemblance of the first equation of the 
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VAR model with Sylos-Labini’s productivity equation is only superficial, for it is based on lagged (not 
current) values of independent variables.25 Turning to the value added, we identified two different effects: a “real time effect”, captured by Sylos-Labini’s original equation, and a “medium term effect”, 
captured by the first equation of the VAR model. The former embodies the immediate impact of internal 
and external economies to scale. Productivity improves as the extension of the market and the size of 
the production process increase. The latter embodies “learning by doing” processes and other 
innovation factors that affect productivity in the medium run. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT HERE FIGURE 3 AND FIGURE 4] 
 
In addition, our Granger causality test suggests that lagged investment positively affects labour 
productivity. Once again, this finding is coherent with Sylos-Labini’s equation. Investment, in turn, is 
affected by demand pressure. By contrast, our estimates do not support the hypothesis that a reverse 
causality exists between labour productivity and the absolute cost of labour. This finding is not 
necessarily at odds with Sylos-Labini’s theory. On the contrary, it might reflect the radical change in the 
political environment that has characterized the European countries since the 1980s. As is well known, 
the last three decades have been marked by the decline in the bargaining power of trade unions and in 
the unionisation rate of the working force. Our findings suggest that, while the employers have managed 
to offset the rise in real wages by increasing productivity through technological and organisational 
innovations, the reverse has not occurred. In other words, wage earners have not benefited from labour 
productivity gains. Finally, the panel VAR model does not support the hypothesis that the absolute cost 
of labour affects the real level of investment.  
7. Conclusions 
We examined the determinants of labour productivity within a sample of EA member-states. We 
focused on the divergent dynamics of core countries relative to peripheral countries. Our empirical 
analysis was grounded in Paolo Sylos-Labini’s endogenous theory of labour productivity. We tested 
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different Panel OLS models. A Panel VAR model was tested as well. Overall, our findings confirm Sylos-Labini’s main insights. Labour productivity in manufacturing industries is strongly and positively 
correlated with the market size (Smith effect), the relative cost of labour (Ricardo effect), the absolute 
cost of labour (organisation effect), and past investment, whereas it is negatively correlated with 
current investment. No correlation with the labour protection index was found instead. Our findings 
hold for both groups of countries. While the null hypothesis that parameter values are identical across 
the two groups cannot be rejected, both the Smith effect and the Ricardo effect are stronger for core 
countries. By contrast, the organisation effect is stronger for peripheral countries. In other words, core 
countries seem to be more sensitive to changes in the size of the market and the relative cost of labour 
(meaning the wage to machine price ratio). Peripheral countries, in turn, seem to be more sensitive to 
changes in the absolute cost of labour. Finally, while current investment affects labour productivity of 
core countries, it does not seem to influence productivity of manufacturing industries in peripheral 
countries. However, the negative effect of the investment on labour productivity is stronger in 
peripheral countries than in core countries in the short run. This is possibly linked with the 
technological gap affecting the EA periphery, which can hardly be bridged by increasing further labour 
market flexibility. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Estimates of productivity function in EA8 – dependent variable: 𝑑(log(𝑃𝑅𝑡))   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2bis Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 𝑑(log(𝑉𝑡)) 0.7322724*** 0.7550214*** 0.7582034*** 0.7592724*** 0.7598966*** 0.572887*** 𝑑(log(𝑈𝑡)) 0.1528584*** 0.1423471*** 0.1409087 * 0.1431701*** 0.1278014*** 0.2170521*** 𝑑(log(𝑊𝑡)) 0.299599*** 0.3228984*** 0.3284804*** 0.3217206*** 0.3260761*** 0.2450983*** 𝐼𝑡  -0.0045496 ** -0.0046588*** -0.0043409** -0.0055402*** -0.0016923 𝐼𝑡−𝜆  0.0033162* 0.0033197*** 0.0033599* 0.0036523* 0.0006741 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠     0.0013609   𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑡     0.0011929  
Adjusted R2 0.68511566 0.694650806 0.692604799 0.694830764 0.718122506 0.6847 (n-adj.) 
Notes: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Significance: *** 1% threshold, ** 5% threshold, * 
10% threshold. Models 1-2 and 3-4 method: pooled OLS, no cross-country fixed effects. Model 2bis method: pooled OLS, cross-
country fixed effects. Model 5 method: 2S-LS, no cross-country fixed effects, no robust errors. Investment lag: 𝜆 = 1.  𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 : 
crisis dummy (2008Q3-2016Q1). Observations: Model 1 = 640; Model 2, 2bis, 3, 5 = 632; Model 4 =560.    
 
Table 2. Estimates of productivity function in peripheral countries – dependent variable: 𝑑(log(𝑃𝑅𝑡))   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 𝑑(log(𝑉𝑡)) 0.6024748*** 0.6364563*** 0.6497951*** 0.6529111*** 0.499133*** 𝑑(log(𝑈𝑡)) 0.1858531*** 0.1801424*** 0.1744017*** 0.1685258*** 0.22862*** 𝑑(log(𝑊𝑡)) 0.2687922*** 0.2878414*** 0.2906792*** 0.2932799*** 0.231357*** 𝐼𝑡  -0.0041905 -0.0035691 -0.0058853** -0.0021383 𝐼𝑡−𝜆  0.0029152 0.0030893 0.0032663 0.0011025 𝐷𝑡   0.0032512   𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑡    0.0010435  
Adjusted R2 0.5321597 0.5389713 0.540254313 0.5819139 0.5383 (n-adj.) 
Notes: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Significance: *** 1% threshold, ** 5% threshold, * 
10% threshold. Models 1-2 and 3-4 method: pooled OLS, no cross-country fixed effects. Model 2bis method: pooled OLS, cross-
country fixed effects. Model 5 method: 2S-LS, no cross-country fixed effects, no robust errors. Investment lag: 𝜆 = 1.  𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 : 
crisis dummy (2008Q3-2016Q1). See section 4 for details about the crisis dummy, 𝐷𝑡. Observations: Model 1, Model 2, 2bis, 3, 







Table 3. Estimates of productivity function in core countries – dependent variable: 𝑑(log(𝑃𝑅𝑡))   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 𝑑(log(𝑉𝑡)) 0 .8320443*** 0.8444334*** 0.8436645*** 0.8431201*** 0.6480371*** 𝑑(log(𝑈𝑡)) 0.1297303*** 0.1162122*** 0.1146351*** 0.103079** 0.210841*** 𝑑(log(𝑊𝑡)) 0.3144876*** 0.3280044*** 0.3295726*** 0.3374841*** 0.2456501*** 𝐼𝑡  -0.0034004** -0.0034337** -0.0034743* 0.0002152 𝐼𝑡−𝜆  -0.0006404 0.0023001 0.0022832 -0.0010901 𝐷𝑡   -0.0003882   𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑡    0.0012096  
Adjusted R2 0.85257607 0.855349551 0.860235711 0.85897149 0.8511 (n-adj.) 
Notes: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Significance: *** 1% threshold, ** 5% threshold, * 
10% threshold. Models 1-2 and 3-4 method: pooled OLS, no cross-country fixed effects. Model 2bis method: pooled OLS, cross-
country fixed effects. Model 5 method: 2S-LS, no cross-country fixed effects, no robust errors. Investment lag: 𝜆 = 1.  𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 : 
crisis dummy (2008Q3-2016Q1). Observations: Model 1, Model 2, 2bis, 3, 5 = 316; Model 4 =280. 
 
Table 4. Estimates of productivity functions in EA8 
 Model A Model B 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡) ) 0.7550404*** 0.7202433*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡 ) ) 0.14114*** 0.1078035 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡) ) 0.3243579*** 0.3167399*** 
 -0.0045006** -0.0082297*** 𝐼𝑡−1 0.0033641* 0.0068762*** 𝐷𝑡 0.0008289 -0.0014681 𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))  0.0593097 𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡))  0.04177 𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡))  0.0062069 𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡  0.0045082 𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡−1  -0.0042305 










Table A1. Data definitions and sources 
Variable Full name Frequency Unit / Measure Source 𝐻 Hours worked, manufacturing Quarterly 1000 hours Eurostat 𝐼𝑁𝑉 Machinery and equipment, 
gross value 
Quarterly Percentage of GDP, s.a. Eurostat 
𝑃 Price index, implicit deflator Quarterly Index (2010=100), s.a. Eurostat 𝑃𝑘 Domestic price of capital goods Quarterly Index (2010=100) [s.a.] Eurostat 𝑉€ Gross value added, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Current prices, million €, 
s.a. 
Eurostat 
?̂?€ Wages and salaries, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Current prices, million €, 
s.a. 
Eurostat 
𝑃𝑅 = 𝑉 ∙ 1000/𝐻 Real gross value added per 
person employed 
Quarterly Real product per hour Our calculations 
𝑈 = 𝑊€/𝑃 Wages and salaries, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Real wages Our calculations 
𝑉 = 𝑉€/𝑃 Gross value added, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Real gross value added Our calculations 
𝑊 = 𝑊€/𝑃𝑘 Relative wages and salaries, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Relative labour cost Our calculations 
𝑊€ = ?̂?€ ∙ 1000/𝐻 Wages and salaries, 
manufacturing 
Quarterly Hourly wages Our calculations 
𝐶𝑂𝑃 Crude oil price (WTI) Quarterly Average, USD per barrel US Energy 
Information 
Administration 𝐿𝑃𝐼 Strictness of employment 
protection – individual and 
collective dismissals (regular 
contracts) 
Annual Index OECD 
 
Table A2. Levin-Lin-Chu test for unit roots 
  Adjusted t statistic  p-value 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) -18.7305 0.0000 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡) ) -12.7818 0.0000 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡  ) ) -17.0619 0.0000 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡) ) -18.7446 0.0000 𝐼𝑡 -0.8066 0.2100 
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Table A3. Chow test for structural breaks 
 
Before the crisis 
(SS 384) 
After the crisis 
(SS 248) 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡) ) 0.8769042*** 0.7252588*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡  ) ) 0.1716455*** 0.0704691 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡) ) 0.2519336*** 0.4747626*** 𝐼𝑡 -0.0034317* -0.0058785* 𝐼𝑡−1 0.0023487 0.0047082 
Adjusted Rsquare 0.70289906 0.700093887 
 
Table A4. Granger causality test 
Equation Excluded p-value 
Reject null hypothesis 
 with ***% significance 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡))       
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡)) 0.069 * 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡)) 0.495  
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡)) 0.796  
 
𝐼𝑡 0.004 *** 
 
All 0.000 *** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))       
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) 0.026 ** 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡)) 0.023 ** 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡)) 0.365  
 
𝐼𝑡 0.102  
 
All 0.001 *** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡))       
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) 0.039 ** 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡)) 0.168  
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡)) 0.026 ** 
 
𝐼𝑡 0.007 *** 
 
All 0.000 *** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))       
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) 0.088 * 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡)) 0.307  
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡)) 0.087  
 
𝐼𝑡 0.297  
 
All 0.092 * 
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 𝐼𝑡       
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) 0.010 ** 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡)) 0.000 *** 
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡)) 0.955  
 
𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡)) 0.021 ** 
 
All 0.000 *** 
 
 
Table A5. “Whatever it takes” dummy (SS 632) 
 Variable Coefficient 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))  0.7541616*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡 ))  0.1416935*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡))  0.3245793*** 𝐼𝑡   -0.0043348** 𝐼𝑡−1  0.0032409* 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠   0.0021427 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.695244196 
 
Table A6. “Euro crisis” dummy (1-lag investment) (SS 632) 
Variable Coefficient 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))  0.8097337*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡 ))  0.133341*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡))  0.3374925*** 𝐼𝑡  -0.0035524** 𝐼𝑡−1  0.0026449 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠   0.0086136*** 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.708961501 
 
Table A7. “Euro crisis” dummy (4-lag investment) (SS 608) 
Variable Coefficient 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡))  0.8178032*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑡 ))  0.1442562*** 𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑡))  0.3290716*** 𝐼𝑡   -0.004427*** 𝐼𝑡−1  0.0037852*** 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠   0.00777*** 







Table A8. 2SLS estimates of productivity function in EA8 – dependent variable: 𝑑(log(𝑃𝑅𝑡)) 
 Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 𝑑(log(𝑉𝑡)) 0.5115759*** 0.5714866*** 0.5427365*** 𝑑(log(𝑈𝑡)) 0.2154949*** 0.2444413*** 0.232371*** 𝑑(log(𝑊𝑡)) 0.2417666*** 0.2176769*** 0.2194812*** 𝐼𝑡  –0.0016649 –0.0019033 𝐼𝑡−𝜆  0.0006534 0.0002351 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠   0.0000267  𝐿𝑃𝐼𝑡   0.0009822 
Adjusted R2 0.667661758 0.684457461 0.701967348 
Notes: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Significance: *** 1% threshold, ** 5% threshold, * 
10% threshold. Pooled OLS, no cross-country fixed effects. Investment lag: 𝜆 = 1.  𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠: crisis dummy (2008Q3-2016Q1). 




Figure 1. Productivity development in periphery vs. core areas 
 
Notes: 1996 = 100. Manufacturing industry. Real value added per employee at 2010 reference level (real GDP-weighted 
average by country group). Quarterly data. Shaded areas show the impact of the 2007 crisis. 
Source: our elaboration on Eurostat data 2016. 
 
Figure 2. Productivity development in selected EA countries 
  
Notes: 1996 = 100. Manufacturing industry. Value added per employee at 2010 reference level. Quarterly data. The shaded 
area shows the impact of the 2007 crisis. 




Figure 3. Impulse response functions of Panel VAR for EA8 (16 steps head, Cholesky ordering: 𝑃𝑅, 𝑉, 𝑈, 𝑊, 𝐼) 
Response of productivity (𝑃𝑅) to a unit shock in value added (𝑉), absolute cost of labour (𝑈), relative cost of 
labour (𝑊), and investment (𝐼) 
 
 
Response of value added (𝑉) to a unit shock in productivity (𝑃𝑅), absolute cost of labour (𝑈), relative cost of 
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Response of D(LOG(V)) to I
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations ± 2 S.E.
31 
 
Response of absolute cost of labour (𝑈) to a unit shock in productivity (𝑃𝑅), value added (𝑉), relative cost of 
labour (𝑊), and investment (𝐼) 
 
 
Response of relative cost of labour (𝑊) to a unit shock in productivity (𝑃𝑅), value added (𝑉), absolute cost of 
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16






2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16






2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16






2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of D(LOG(W)) to I
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Response of investment (𝐼) to a unit shock in productivity (𝑃𝑅), value added (𝑉), absolute cost of labour (𝑈), 
and relative cost of labour (𝑊) 
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of I to D(LOG(W))
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations ± 2 S.E.
                                                            
       10     .88846  .0601709   .011522  .0125209  .0273262
        9   .8920306  .0591337  .0102415  .0125644  .0260298
        8   .9019009  .0604237  .0088925  .0052646  .0235184
        7   .9040213  .0595019  .0088694  .0041432   .023464
        6   .9085478  .0570302  .0077289  .0033453  .0233479
        5   .9217689  .0500677  .0046727  .0033897   .020101
        4   .9372354  .0432106  .0009367   .001114  .0175033
        3   .9387462  .0421296  .0009202  .0006724  .0175316
        2   .9399478  .0422082  .0005558  .0000394  .0172488
        1          1         0         0         0         0
        0          0         0         0         0         0
PR         
                                                            
horizon           PR         V         W         U         I
Forecast                    Impulse variable                
and        
variable   
Response   






                                                            
       10   .5398672   .391578  .0168042  .0297111  .0220395
        9   .5401826  .3917998  .0165275  .0294371  .0220529
        8   .5463446  .4046003  .0164964  .0114503  .0211083
        7   .5479418  .4051647  .0164846  .0114864  .0189224
        6   .5500723  .4049882  .0164047  .0106675  .0178673
        5   .5508181  .4067686   .015073  .0093801  .0179602
        4   .5589446  .4118109  .0064486   .004566  .0182298
        3   .5579789   .418103  .0061555  .0044982  .0132644
        2    .575431  .4076611  .0030461   .000433  .0134288
        1   .5988532  .4011468         0         0         0
        0          0         0         0         0         0
V          
                                                            
horizon           PR         V         W         U         I
Forecast                    Impulse variable                
and        
variable   
Response   
                                                            
Forecast-error variance decomposition
                                                            
       10   .2029321  .1312177  .2703858  .3642901  .0311742
        9   .2042354  .1295397  .2713654  .3661384  .0287211
        8   .2054332  .1281538  .2725781  .3658207  .0280142
        7   .1936709  .1314861  .2808844  .3758396   .018119
        6   .1913663  .1278168  .2868392  .3840079  .0099698
        5   .1912061  .1276037  .2879768  .3857443   .007469
        4   .1921027  .1283736  .2862855   .388134  .0051042
        3   .1948946  .1287997  .2807073  .3927631  .0028353
        2   .1989369  .1281244  .2776152  .3953104  .0000131
        1   .1963216  .0948361   .288423  .4204194         0
        0          0         0         0         0         0
U          
                                                            
horizon           PR         V         W         U         I
Forecast                    Impulse variable                
and        
variable   
Response   









                                                            
       10   .1223731   .243301   .585296  .0358172  .0132128
        9   .1220204  .2433636  .5869841   .035791   .011841
        8   .1220575  .2445242  .5854911   .036224  .0117032
        7   .1174074  .2463859  .5918736  .0330353  .0112979
        6    .121659  .2357543  .6133276  .0233309  .0059282
        5   .1212769  .2330289  .6181495  .0217135  .0058312
        4   .1217074  .2339977  .6192268  .0213709  .0036973
        3   .1230346  .2362061  .6189446  .0198122  .0020025
        2   .1256534  .2411068  .6284086  .0033136  .0015176
        1    .111853  .2236341  .6645128         0         0
        0          0         0         0         0         0
W          
                                                            
horizon           PR         V         W         U         I
Forecast                    Impulse variable                
and        
variable   
Response   
                                                            
Forecast-error variance decomposition
                                                            
       10   .1232079  .2167677  .0221823  .0014339  .6364083
        9   .1257946   .200087  .0225808  .0012944  .6502432
        8   .1322839  .1824776  .0234019   .001246  .6605906
        7    .131989  .1598386  .0271497  .0014467  .6795759
        6   .1319226   .142352  .0288322  .0017167  .6951766
        5   .1201505  .1353398  .0334818  .0017945  .7092336
        4   .0985829   .118652  .0328908  .0021323  .7477421
        3   .0836043  .0909568  .0116234    .00286  .8109555
        2   .0787413  .0432146  .0085515  .0034816   .866011
        1   .0448277   .010584  .0049602   .003421  .9362071
        0          0         0         0         0         0
I          
                                                            
horizon           PR         V         W         U         I
Forecast                    Impulse variable                
and        
variable   
Response   





1 Following a widely adopted classification (see De Santis and Cesaroni (2016) or Lapavitsas et al. (2010)), the group of core countries includes four EA’s member-states, notably, Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (we do not include 
Belgium and Luxemburg because of data availability reasons). The group of peripheral countries is made up of four EA’s 
members, notably, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (we do not include Ireland because of data availability reasons).   
2 Following Sylos-Labini, we use 𝑈 = 𝑊€/𝑃 as an indicator of the absolute cost of labour (Sylos-Labini 1984, p. 173). However, 
unlike Sylos-Labini, but in line with Guarini (2007), we considered both 𝑈 = 𝑊€/𝑃 and 𝑊 = 𝑊€/𝑃𝑘 in our model. The former 
aims at capturing the organisation effect, while the latter aims at capturing the Ricardo effect.  
3 Some authors have stressed the link of Sylos-Labini’s productivity equation with Schumpeter’s analysis of innovation (e.g. 
Kleinknecht 1998; Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010). The point is that changes in unit labour costs drive “natural selection” or “creative destruction” of firms. Routine firms and/or laggards are thrown out of the market, due to the higher costs of 
production, while innovative firms face the opportunity to increase their own market share.  
4 Sylos-Labini recovers and develops an idea originally formulated in chapters I and XXXI of the last edition of Ricardo’s 
Principles (Ricardo 1821). In spite of the superficial resemblance, Sylos-Labini’s rendition of Ricardo effect is at odds with the “neoclassical” hypothesis of smooth substitutability of inputs (and the claim that there would be a monotonic non-increasing 
relationship between the capital intensity of production techniques and the rate of profit). The latter expresses a static theory 
of allocation efficiency and income distribution, whereas the former underpins a dynamic theory of labour productivity growth’s determinants. Notice that Sylos-Labini’ interpretation of the “Ricardo effect” is controversial. It has been (implicitly) 
questioned by Gehrke (2003). However, we do not focus here on this theoretical and terminological dispute, due to the 
empirical nature of our work. 
5 Sylos-Labini suggests using both the real investment and the cost of labour relative to the price of investment goods as regressors, for “it is necessary to distinguish the determinants of [investment] level from those of its composition (labor-saving 
and capacity- increasing investment). The level of investment depends primarily on demand pressure, as expressed by the 
degree of utilized capacity; current profits, as the source of self-financing; the expected rate of profit; and the availability and 
the cost of external finance (Sylos-Labini, 1974, ch. 1). The composition of investment depends primarily on the relative cost 
of labor. However, it is impossible to say to what extent a labor-saving investment is stimulated by an increase in the w/Pm 
ratio, and to what extent it is independent of the increase. As it can be profitable to introduce labor-saving innovations even if 
that ratio holds firm, it would be wrong to assume that the changes in that ratio are the only reason, or even the main reason, 
for the labor-saving investment. Consequently, we cannot exclude one of the two variables on the ground that its influence is already fully contained in the other; it is advisable, instead, to include both variables” (Sylos Labini 1983, p. 172-173). 
6 Notice that the “directed technical change” literature draws insight on technological growth induced by pricing (and hence 
taxation) mechanisms (Acemoglu 1998, 2002). This has been applied to the so-called green transition from “dirty” production 
towards “clean” production in which input costs induce or not an investment in cleaner technological innovation (Acemoglu 
et al., 2012, 2014). We do not look further into this, as we only concentrate on labour productivity gains. Hence, price 
mechanisms are already factored in via real wage and wage relative to capital costs effects. 
7 The Durbin-Watson statistic was always close to 2. When we found that error terms could be negatively correlated, a Breusch-
Godfrey test was made. A Ljung-Box Q-statistic was used too.  
8 Since this is an adaptation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to panel data, we selected the number of lags by using the AIC 
criterion (with at most 10 lags).  
9 The same point is made by Angeriz et al. (2008) who estimate the Kaldor-Verodoorn law using instrumental variables. Notice 
that the advantage of using an instrumental variable approach is that it allows controlling for variables that are unobserved or 
omitted from the equation, but possibly correlated with the real value added (Green 2012, p. 259). 
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10 The fact is that a lower employment rate is usually associated with a higher estimate of productivity, as the people excluded 
from the labour market are likely to be the least qualified or educated (e.g. Piketty 2017).  
11 We chose the number of lags by comparing different models through the Akaike's information criterion. The best result (AIC 
= -3779.52) was obtained by using one lag. Notice that the sample narrows down as the number lags increases. Consequently, 
we chose to limit our analysis to 4 lags. 
12 It is worth mentioning here a recurring feature of investment coefficients. Our estimates are usually consistent with Sylos-Labini’s theory, meaning that the short-run investment coefficient has a negative sign whereas the long-run one has a positive 
sign. However, coefficient values are generally rather low. This does not mean that the impact of investment on productivity 
is lower than the impact of other variables. Investment is taken as a ratio to GDP, while other regressors and the dependent 
variable are expressed as growth rates. However, Sylos Labini (1983, p. 173) stressed that the investment level represents the 
net addition to the stock of capital. Consequently, its behaviour conforms generally to that of the rate of change of capital stock. 
The point is that the impact of investment on productivity follows a longer historical path than the other dependent variables. 
This is also the reason response functions to investment shocks in figure 3 are rather flat.  
13 The critical value at 1% threshold is 2.6682148 (restrictions: 8; sample size: 632). This is well above the F statistic, which is 
0.46. 
14 The fall in GDP growth rates since the third quarter of 2008 shows that, even though the collapse of Lehman Brothers took 
place in the US, it affected sharply Euro Area’s member-states. 
15 The Chow statistic is 4.9448867, while the critical value of the F-statistic is 2.8305354 (restrictions = 6, sample size = 632). 
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that pre-crisis coefficients are not statistically different from their post-crisis 
values. 
16 In principle, firms can also reduce their employees’ working day. However, there are (country-specific) institutional 
constraints to this option. 
17 Arguably, a thorough analysis of the impact of labour market rigidities on productivity would require us to use other 
estimation techniques and/or to consider a variety of institutional features. For instance, Nickell (1997) uses cross-country 
institutional variables (e.g. replacement rates, benefit durations, active labour market policies, union coverage indices, etc.) to 
explain the differences between North American and European unemployment rates. Some of these rigidities affect 
productivity, while other rigidities may well entail a positive effect. For the sake of simplicity, we neglect this possible 
complication. Notice also that the OECD labour protection index has been questioned because of the arbitrary weighting system 
and the possible interactions of different components (e.g. a stricter EPL for permanent contracts is associated with an increase 
in temporary contracts) (Boeri and Van Ours 2013).    
18 The F statistic is 1.8047042, against a critical value of 2.2156941. 
19 As for the consistency of the 2S-LS estimation, we checked the possible weakness of instrumental variables through a F-test. 
The latter assesses the overall model significance of regressing the endogenous variable on the instrumental variables. Since 
we obtained a p-value = 0.0000, we rejected the null hypothesis of weak instruments. We also checked the possible correlation 
of instrumental variables with the residuals of the model (endogeneity). A Sargan instrument validity test was conducted. The 
null hypothesis of non-correlation was not rejected, thereby confirming the validity of the instruments chosen. 
20 We used Model 5 to check also the impact of real wages on productivity when different lags are applied. The reason is that a 
more efficient organisation takes time to be effective. Coefficients become positive after 4 lags (one year). Abstracting from the “spuriously simultaneous” case (lag = 0), the first significant coefficient (at 5% confidence level) shows up after 7 lags. 
Remarkably, both the sign and significance of coefficients are consistent with the results we obtained using the panel VAR 
model presented section 6. 
21 Due to institutional homogeneity and data availability concerns, Ireland was excluded from estimations shown by Tables 1 
and 2. Consequently, peripheral countries are the Mediterranean countries. Notice inter alia that France and Italy could be 
regarded as somewhat “spurious” cases. The French economy shares some of the issues faced by peripheral countries, think 
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of the deterioration of the balance of trade since the launch of Euro. By contrast, the Italian economy has never performed as 
bad as other peripheral countries in terms of balance of trade. However, labour productivity has been stagnating in Italy during 
the last two decades.    
22 We used a Chow test in model 3 to assess whether the distinction between peripheral and core countries was significant. 
The F-statistic of the Chow test was 1.2034559, while the critical value (restrictions: 6; observation: 332) at the 1% threshold 
is 2.8310911 (or 2.1131859 at 5%). Interestingly enough, if France were included in the periphery, the F-statistic of the Chow 
test (3.9131603) would have largely outstripped the critical threshold. 
23 The 8-lag model is that with the highest coefficient of determination (0.9784) for 𝜆 ≤ 8. 
24 Notice that the test entails a series of F-tests comparing the original model with amended models, in which either one “provisional independent” variable or all the other “independent” variables altogether are excluded. 
25 This means that it would be inappropriate to use a Granger causality test to test Sylos-Labini’s theory. 
 
 
 
